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IN RE COLONIAL REALTY CO. :* THE SECOND
CIRCUIT HARMONIZES BANKRUPTCY AND BANK
INSOLVENCY LAW (REJECTING ESTABLISHED
BANKRUPTCY CASE LAW IN THE PROCESS)
John R. Ashmead**
In FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.),' the Second
Circuit addressed issues of first impression concerning the
interaction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act2 ("FDIA" or
"Act") and the Bankruptcy Code.3 The interaction of these
laws generally occurs when the constituencies they aim to
protect must look to the same assets to satisfy their claims. In
a well-reasoned opinion, the Second Circuit harmonized
ostensibly conflicting provisions of the Act and the Bankruptcy
Code. Specifically, the court determined that the automatic
stay,4 a fundamental aspect of our bankruptcy system, applied
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")5 and
* 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992).
** Associate, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. The author expresses
his gratitude to Alan Kornberg and Deborah Prutzman of Paul, Weiss for re-
viewing drafts of this Article.
' 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Colonial Realty].
2 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1834 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4 The automatic stay, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. V 1993),
provides generally that the filing of a bankruptcy petition by operation of law
automatically "stays," i.e., restrains, creditors from taking further action against
the debtor, property of the debtor, or property of the estate to collect their claims
or enforce their liens.
Established to protect the public's faith in depository institutions, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") is granted powers under and
charged with administering the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDIA" or "Act").
12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988 & Supp. I 1989). The FDIC discharges its statutory duties
by assuming various roles. In its "corporate" capacity, the FDIC administers the
FDIC insurance fund, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 27-31, and
regulates financial institutions. In its "conservator" role, the FDIC operates
troubled institutions and arranges for the disposition of the institutions' assets and
liabilities. As a "receiver," the FDIC marshals a failed institution's assets and
makes distributions to creditors. See generally BARRY S. ZISMAN, BANKS AND
THRIFTS: GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT AND RECEIVERSHIP § 11.01 (1993 & Supp.
July 1993). For simplicity, unless otherwise indicated, references to "FDIC" in this
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barred it from exercising its powers to avoid asset transfers
previously made by the debtor. In the course of its
determination, the Second Circuit repudiated the long-accepted
view that a debtor retains some legal or equitable interest in
fraudulently transferred property.
The Second Circuit's decision was supported by
fundamental statutory construction and policy considerations.6
First, the court addressed the applicability of the automatic
stay to actions to recover property fraudulently transferred by
the debtor before bankruptcy.7 The court determined that the
debtor retained no interest in such property, but that suits to
recover the property were barred by the stay because the suits
would be predicated on a claim against the debtor.8 Because of
that determination, the Second Circuit had to consider the
FDIC's argument that the laws were in conflict and the Act
should prevail over conflicting provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.9 The Second Circuit examined the alleged "conflict" and
concluded that the goals of each law could be achieved under
the circumstances."
Colonial Realty is the most recent federal court of appeals
decision to address the "conflicting" provisions and policies of
laws applying to failed banks and bankruptcy cases. It is not
likely to be the last. The Second Circuit's ruling in Colonial
Realty responds to a number of cases brought over the last few
years that have pitted long-standing precepts of bankruptcy
law against the FDIC's nascent powers." The court's decision
sends a message that the FDIC's many and varied powers do
not exist in a vacuum; they exist within a framework of many
federal laws-including some with competing objectives.
Article mean the FDIC in all of its capacities.
6 The decision primarily rested upon two related canons of statutory
construction: (1) a later statute will not repeal an earlier statute by implication
unless the statutes are irreconcilable; and (2) when addressing the ostensibly
inconsistent requirements of two statutes, courts must strive to give effect to both





" While the FDIC was created 61 years ago, the focus of this Article is on the
powers recently granted to the FDIC to help it resolve the bank failure crisis of
the 1980s.
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Colonial Realty demonstrates, however, that the FDIC's
powers can be harmonized with the most basic bankruptcy
policy objectives.
Part I of this Article considers the primary objectives and
certain fundamental aspects of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act and the Bankruptcy Code. In Part II, Colonial Realty-its
facts, the parties' arguments and the court's decision-is
summarized. Part III analyzes the Second Circuit's decision.
The Article concludes with a discussion of other decisions that
have addressed similar conflicts between the Act and the
Bankruptcy Code.
I. OVERVIEW OF BANK INSOLVENCY LAW AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. Objectives
Bank insolvency and bankruptcy law have distinct objec-
tives. The paramount objective of bank insolvency law is the
maintenance of public confidence in the nation's banking sys-
tem.12 FDIC insurance is the most visible symbol of this objec-
tive. 3 Public confidence in the banking system results in de-
posits, which provide banks with capital for lending purposes.
Loans in turn support local economies and, in the aggregate,
the national economy. Bank insolvency law seeks to avoid bank
"runs" caused by a sudden collapse in confidence, common dur-
ing the Great Depression, but also witnessed in recent
years.14
Bankruptcy law, by contrast, is not concerned with main-
taining confidence in a particular system, but in promoting two
fundamental goals. First, bankruptcy law gives debtors the op-
portunity to make a "fresh start," by granting them a second
chance at becoming economically viable. 5 Second, bankruptcy
12 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT (1993) [hereinafter AN-
NUAL REPORT]; ZISMAN, supra note 5, §§ 11.01, 11.02.
13 The FDIC provides $100,000 insurance for each depositor account relation-
ship with an FDIC-insured bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
" See generally Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Laws Now That It Matters
Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469 (1992). In the last several years, the Bank of New Eng-
land, in 1990, and First Republicbank, in 1988, suffered such "runs." See Thomas
C. Hayes, RepublicBank in Settlement with FDIC, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1991, at
D5; Stephen Labaton, U.S. is Taking Over a Group of Banks to Head Off a Run,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1991, at Al.
1 See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
1994]
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law stops the "race to the courthouse" by placing all similarly
situated creditors on an equal footing such that all such credi-
tors receive ratable recoveries. 6 Bankruptcy theory suggests
that on the whole, both debtors and creditors benefit from this
approach."7
While their goals are dissimilar, the mechanics of bank
insolvency and bankruptcy law are quite similar. 8 Each is
predicated on a federal statutory scheme; one deals with the
failure of federally insured financial institutions, 9 the other
with the insolvency of natural and most artificial persons."
Bank insolvency law attempts to make depositors whole by
marshaling the assets of the failed bank through avoidance
powers and other causes of action, and deposit insurance."
The Bankruptcy Code strives to treat equitably the debtor's
creditors by marshaling the debtor's assets through avoidance
powers and other causes of action, and by reducing the assets
to cash and distributing the proceeds to creditors. In either
case, claimants submit their claims for determination to a
disinterested arbiter: under the FDIA, the FDIC receiver;22 in
bankruptcy, bankruptcy courts."
H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 74, 75 (1973), reprinted in WILLIAM M.
COLLIER, 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter Commission Report]; THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 4-5 (1986).
16 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6138.
17 See generally Commission Report, supra note 15, at 61-74 (discussing the
bankruptcy philosophy and its impact on credit markets and commerce).
1" First City Asset Servicing Co. v. FDIC (In re First City Asset Servicing Co.),
158 B.R. 78, 80 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
"' See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1834. Between 1984 and 1992, 1339 banks insured by
the FDIC failed. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 168.
2 The United States Bankruptcy Code is codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330.
Notably, the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part that:
(b) A person may be a debtor under chapter 7 . . . only if such person
is not-
(2) a domestic insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative
bank, savings and loan association, building and loan associa-
tion ... or similar institution which is an insured bank as
defined in . . . (12 U.S.C. [§] 1813(h)) ....
11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1988).
21 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a), (d), (f), (g).
22 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d), (i).
2 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988).
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Both the Bankruptcy Code and the FDIA establish distri-
bution priority. The Bankruptcy Code's distribution scheme
treats unsecured creditors in a substantially identical manner,
with few exceptions.24 Under the Act, however, unsecured
creditors are not treated as equals; they are subdivided into
three distinct priority groups: the bank depositors, the FDIC
and general unsecured creditors." The bank's depositors
(creditors by virtue of their deposits) receive the best treat-
ment, including deposit insurance coverage of up to $100,000
per depositor. Through the payment of insurance to depositors,
FDIC "corporate" becomes subrogated to the depositors' claims
against the failed institution and, in the process, often becomes
the largest creditor of the FDIC "receiver."26 Generally, not
until depositors and the FDIC are made whole do other gener-
al unsecured creditors participate in distributions. Further-
more, if the recovery from the institution is less than the
amount of FDIC insurance paid, the FDIC (and, indirectly,
taxpayers) bears that loss, while general unsecured creditors
receive nothing.
B. Bank Insolvency Law
Congress created the FDIC in 1933 in response to the
widespread bank failures during the Great Depression. The
FDIA established an insurance fund financed by bank premi-
ums and put the FDIC in charge of administering that fund.2"
To help the FDIC in its task, Congress empowered the FDIC to
supervise and regulate FDIC-insured banks.29 The FDIC also
was given the responsibility of managing troubled and failed
2" The Bankruptcy Code does establish priority among unsecured creditors. See
11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988) and 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In most
bankruptcy cases, however, high-priority, unsecured creditors are not as large and
ubiquitous as is the FDIC in a bank insolvency.
2 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1991).
26 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a), (g). See supra note 5.
27 See S. 1821, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2-5 (1960), reprinted in 1960
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3234, 3234-37. The FDIC provisions originally were codified as
an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act, but were withdrawn in 1950 and re-
codified and renamed as the Federal Deposit Insurance Act at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-
1833.
28 ZISMAN, supra note 5, at § 19.02[2].
29 ZISMAN, supra note 5, at § 19.02[2].
1994]
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insured institutions."0 The original version of the Act re-
mained in effect until Congress passed several important laws
updating the Act in response to the bank failure crisis that
began in the mid-1980s.3" These new laws endowed the FDIC
with what have been commonly referred to as "superpow-
ers.32 Two of these "superpowers" were implicated in Colonial
Realty: fraudulent conveyance avoidance power and anti-in-
junction power.33
30 ZISMAN, supra note 5, at § 19.02[3]. The FDIC manages failed banks, and
the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") manages failed thrifts (including savings
and loan associations, building and loan associations, and savings banks). In this
Article, the phrase "failed bank" is used for both FDIC-managed banks and RTC-
managed thrifts.
"' The laws that give the FDIC its charter include the Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of Titles 2, 12, 15 and 31 U.S.C.); the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA") of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183
(codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 2, 5, 12, 15, 18, 26, 28, 31, 40,
42 and 44 U.S.C.); the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat.
4789 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 11, 12, 18 and 28 U.S.C.) (also known
as the Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery
Act of 1990); and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12,
15 U.S.C.). See Swire, supra note 14, at 473-74.
32 Congress and the courts have provided the agencies with "superpowers" in
their handling of an institution's estate. That is, the FDIC and RTC gain powers
in insolvency that would not have been available to the institution pre-insolvency,
or to a non-bank in insolvency-to the disadvantage of third parties. Swire, supra
note 14, at 474.
See generally ZISMAN, supra note 5, §§ 19, 24. The other superpowers are:
FDIC Stay-upon request by the FDIC, a court shall stay any judicial action
in which the failed bank is or becomes a party through intervention or impleader.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12).
Cross-Guarantees-any loss incurred by the FDIC due to the failure of one
bank is automatically assessed against its affiliate banks, irrespective of whether
the affiliate banks contributed to the failure. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1988 & Supp. V
1993). Under the cross-guarantees provision, stockholders are not guarantors; their
claims against or interests in the failed bank, however, are subordinated to the
FDIC's claims, even when the shareholders also are creditors, and the affiliate's
liability is to commonly controlled entities (including other insured depository insti-
tutions). See Swire, supra note 14, at 482 (the affiliate's obligation to the FDIC
under the cross-guarantees provision has priority over the affiliate's liability to its
shareholders (including a bank holding company)).
Injunctive Relief-the FDIC may request any court of competent jurisdiction to
freeze the assets of debtors of the failed bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(18); see also,
FDIC v. Cafritz, 762 F. Supp. 1503, 1505 (D.D.C. 1991).
Extension of Limitations Periods-the FDIC is granted the longer of the state
law statute of limitations period or three years for tort claims, six years for con-
tract claims and five years for fraudulent transfer claims. These periods do not
[Vol. 60:517
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First, under its fraudulent conveyance avoidance powers,
the FDIC can avoid certain transfers of property, interests in
property, or obligations incurred by, among others, a person
who is a debtor of an FDIC-insured institution, as long as two
conditions are met: (1) the transfer was made or the obligation
incurred within five years of the FDIC's appointment as receiv-
er and (2) the transfer was made or the obligation was in-
curred with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud the insured
depository institution, receiver or federal banking agency. 4
Furthermore, the FDIC has the right to recover fraudulently
transferred property or its value for the benefit of the insured
depository institution, and that right is "superior to any rights
of a trustee or any other party (other than a party that is a
begin to run until either the FDIC's appointment or accrual of the cause of action,
whichever is later. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A).
Removal Power-the FDIC may remove to federal district court any action in
which it is a party in any capacity. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
Discretionary Claim Treatment-although the FDIC's maximum liability to any
single creditor is the liquidation value of the creditor's claim, the FDIC has discre-
tion to make discriminatory payments to creditors in excess of the statutory limits.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(2), (i)(3)(A).
Special Defenses-the FDIC takes a failed bank's negotiable instruments under
a federal common-law, holder-in-due-course doctrine that defeats an obligor's per-
sonal defenses. Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1248-49 (5th Cir.
1990). In addition, FIRREA essentially codified the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine,
which precludes an obligor from asserting that a side agreement, which is not
otherwise contained in the records of the failed bank, relieves the obligor of his
obligations to the bank, which may be founded upon a written loan agreement, a
promissory note, or both. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1942); Bell & Murphy & Assocs. v.
Interfirst Bank Gateway, 894 F.2d 750, 755-54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
895 (1990). Finally, assets in the possession of the FDIC in its receivership capaci-
ty are not subject to attachment. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(C).
Contract Rejection-the FDIC, within a "reasonable period" after its appoint-
ment, may reject any contract or lease that it deems burdensome, if rejection
would promote the failed bank's orderly administration. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1)-(2).
Contract damages are limited to actual, direct compensatory damages incurred
immediately before the FDIC's appointment. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3). Certain "quali-
fied financial contracts," including securities contracts, commodities contracts, re-
purchase agreements and swap agreements may not be repudiated unless the
FDIC can demonstrate an actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the insured
depository institution, the receiver or a federal banking agency. 12 U.S.C. §
1821(e)(8)(C).
Contract Enforcement-the FDIC may enforce any contract, other than an
officer's or director's liability insurance contract or a depository institution bond,
notwithstanding an ipso facto termination clause. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12)(A).
34 12 U.S.C § 1821(d)(17) (Supp. V 1993).
1994]
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Federal agency) under Title 11."" Second, under the FDIC's
anti-injunction aegis, no court may take any action by regu-
lation or order to restrain or affect the powers or functions of
the FDIC, except at the request of the FDIC.36
In addition to these "superpowers," the Federal Reserve
Board and other bank regulators have asserted the so-called
"source-of-strength" doctrine against bank holding compa-
nies.17 Under this doctrine, a bank holding company is re-
quired to serve as a source of financial and managerial
strength to its subsidiary banks.3" Failure to do so is regarded
as an "unsafe and unsound practice," and can lead to an agen-
cy enforcement action." Under this doctrine, regulators at-
tempt to force a bank holding company to fund a subsidiary
bank's losses to prevent the subsidiary from failing."
Finally, the FDIC is not subject to the direction or supervi-
sion of any federal or state agency or department.41 Doubtless,
Congress has endowed the FDIC with extensive tools to deal
with bank failure." Problems arise, however, when these
powers collide with bankruptcy law and policy.
C. Bankruptcy Law
Like conservatorship and receivership under the FDIA, the
Bankruptcy Code provides for reorganization and liquidation
proceedings. Liquidation generally is carried out under Chap-
"' Id. § 1821(d)(17)(D). The FDIC thus stands ahead of all other claimants,
except federal agencies, in collecting from the bankruptcy estate of the transferee.
Swire, supra note 14, at 486.
36 12 U.S.C. § 1821().
I 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Serv. 4-878 (Apr. 24, 1987).
as 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1993). See generally Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding
Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 507, 528-32
(1994).
"' 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Serv. J 4-878; see also Jackson, supra note 38, at 529,
530 n.72.
40 Jackson, supra note 38, at 528-29. The "source-of-strength" doctrine is not
unlike the cross-guarantees provision. See supra note 33. A primary difference,
however, is that the "source-of-strength" doctrine is invoked before the bank fails
to help prevent its failure, whereas the cross-guarantees provision is applicable
only after a bank failure, thereby diminishing the FDIC's loss.
41 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(C), (c)(3)(C).
42 Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hirsch (In re Colo-
nial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 92-5023); see also FDIC v.
Cafritz, 762 F. Supp. 1503, 1509 (D.D.C. 1991).
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ter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and reorganization is carried out
under Chapter 11." Whereas the FDIC takes charge of a
failed bank, maintaining or dismissing management as it sees
fit, under a Chapter 7 liquidation case, debtors automatically
are ousted from control of their property." In a Chapter 7
case, the trustee (the individual who takes charge of the
debtor's property) collects the nonexempt property of the debt-
or, converts that property to cash, and distributes the proceeds
to creditors. Chapter 7 involves a significant trade-off for a
debtor: the debtor gives up all nonexempt property in the hope
of obtaining a discharge-a release from all liability on pre-
bankruptcy debts.
Unlike a liquidation case under Chapter 7, in a Chapter
11 reorganization case creditors generally look to future earn-
ings of the debtor for their recovery, not just to the property of
the debtor existing at the time of the bankruptcy filing. The
debtor typically retains its assets and makes payments over
time to creditors pursuant to a court-approved reorganization
plan.
The bankruptcy court oversees most aspects of the cases
before it, approving or rejecting numerous proposed actions by
the debtor or its trustee, and ruling on issues raised by credi-
tors. In contrast, once the FDIC takes control of a failed bank,
it makes all of the decisions concerning the bank, subject to
review only upon challenge by suit filed in a federal district
court.45
' Liquidation may occur under Chapter 11 when the assets of the debtor are
better liquidated in a more orderly fashion to maximize values. The more custom-
ary liquidation under Chapter 7 contemplates expeditious liquidation of assets,
generally without regard to the value potential of such assets over time.
" In Chapter 11, the presumption is that the debtor will remain in possession
of its property as a debtor in possession throughout the case. A Chapter 11 trust-
ee may be appointed, however, for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1988).
" Under the Act, creditors with claims against the failed depository institution
or its receiver
must first present their claims to the receiver, who decides the disputes
according to the procedures contained in the statute. [12 U.S.C.] §
1821(d)(3)-(10). The receiver has 180 days in which to make a determina-
tion on the claim .... then the claimant has 60 days after the notice
of disallowance either to request an administrative review or to com-
mence a de novo action in the appropriate federal district court. §
1821(d)(6)(A). If the receiver fails to give notice of disallowance within
the claim determination period, then the claimant has 60 days from the
end of that period to request an administrative review or file suit in the
1994]
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The Bankruptcy Code provides certain powers to debtors
and trustees that are analogous to the FDIC superpowers
implicated in Colonial Realty.46 First, the Bankruptcy Code
provides an anti-injunction power in the form of an automatic
stay. The filing of a petition in bankruptcy, without any fur-
ther action, results in a stay by operation of law. This prevents
the commencement or continuation of any action or proceeding
against the debtor or the property of the estate; any act to cre-
ate, perfect or enforce a security interest in the debtor's proper-
ty; and, any act to collect, assess or recover a claim against the
debtor or the property of the estate.4 7 The automatic stay pre-
vents the issuance of an injunction, except in furtherance of a
governmental unit's police or regulatory powers.48 Second, like
the FDIA, the Bankruptcy Code provides for fraudulent con-
veyance avoidance. A debtor or its trustee in bankruptcy can
avoid transfers that were actually or constructively fraudu-
lent.49
appropriate federal court.
Lloyd v. FDIC, 812 F. Supp. 293, 297 (D.R.I. 1993), vacated on other grounds, 22
F.3d 335 (1st Cir. 1994).
" The Bankruptcy Code analogues to the other superpowers mentioned above
are the following:
Limitations Periods-the Bankruptcy Code establishes certain limitations peri-
ods, tolls certain limitation periods, and allows the debtor or its trustee to abide
nonbankruptcy law limitation periods. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 544, 548, 550
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Removal Power-the Bankruptcy Code permits removal to federal district
court of any state court claims related to bankruptcy cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1452
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Claim Treatment-unlike the FDIC, a debtor in bankruptcy may not exercise
discretion in paying claims; claims are paid strictly according to the statutory
distribution scheme. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1129 (1988).
Special Defenses-a debtor or its trustee in bankruptcy, unlike the FDIC, does
not gain any holder-in-due-course or D'Oench, Duhme defenses by filing for bank-
ruptcy protection unless the debtor had such defenses available to it before bank-
ruptcy. A debtor or its trustee does, however, gain the ability to void unperfected
or improperly perfected security interests. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Injunctive Relief-the debtor's or trustee's ability to obtain an injunction rests
on proof of the standard injunction elements. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7065.
Contract Rejection-like the Act, the Bankruptcy Code permits the rejection of
burdensome leases and contracts; unlike the Act, however, the rejection claim is
not limited to the out-of-pocket damages incurred prior to the bankruptcy filing. 11
U.S.C. § 365 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
47 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4 11 U.S.C. § 362(b).
9 The statute of limitations period is one year or the relevant applicable state
[Vol. 60: 517
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Unlike the FDIC, however, bankruptcy creditors do not
have an analogue to the source-of-strength power. There is no
similar power for creditors to reach the assets of shareholders
or affiliates, absent a successful veil-piercing action.5"
The Crime Control Act of 1990 added several amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code that give greater rights to the FDIC
and other bank regulators involved with debtors in bankruptcy
proceedings. Many of the amendments clearly prohibit a debtor
from using bankruptcy as a shield against liability for fraud or
mismanagement of a bank.5'
Other significant amendments concern "capital mainte-
nance commitments," agreements entered into between an
insured depository institution's purchaser and a regulatory
agency, which provide that the purchaser will commit its own
assets to maintain capital at certain levels if necessary.5"
Three amendments to the Bankruptcy Code implement this
objective. The first makes the malicious or reckless failure to
fulfill such a commitment a nondischargeable debt.53 Second,
law period. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548, 550. The FDIC's five-year period or state-law
period is an enhancement over the powers of its bankruptcy counterpart.
"o Substantive consolidation is a consensual veil-piercing bankruptcy concept
that, for purposes of repayment, treats several debtors or parties affiliated with a
debtor as one entity. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
" For instance, debts arising out of fraud or defalcation while acting as a fidu-
ciary (under the definitional amendments-a director, officer, employee, controlling
stockholder, agent or other control person) of an insured bank are not discharge-
able. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(11) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (fraud or defalcation while
in fiduciary capacity nondischargeable); 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(33), 523(e) ("fiduciary"
includes "institution-affiliated party," which is defined with a reference to 12
U.S.C. § 1813(u) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Before the amendments, § 523(a)(4),
which prevented discharge of a debt arising from fraud or defalcation while acting
in a fiduciary capacity, was not applicable to directors, officers or controlling per-
sons of a bank.
Additionally, the FDIC/RTC is excused from the strict deadlines to challenge
the dischargeability of certain debts if the FDIC/RTC was not appointed in time to
reasonably comply. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(2); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c). In a related
amendment, an exception to the debtor's right to exempt property was added to
the Bankruptcy Code so that otherwise exempt assets may be used to satisfy
debts to the FDIC/RTC for fraud, embezzlement, larceny, or willful or malicious
injury of an insured depository institution. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
2 Put another way, a "capital maintenance commitment" is a bank purchaser's
agreement to become another source of capital to bolster the bank so that the risk
of failure is minimized and the need to tap the FDIC's deposit insurance fund
becomes unlikely.
" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(12).
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in a Chapter 7 case, a bank receiver's capital maintenance
commitment claim is given priority over the claims of other
general unsecured creditors.54 The most controversial amend-
ment in furtherance of this objective, however, is new section
365(o), which requires a Chapter 11 debtor to assume and
perform a capital maintenance commitment according to its
terms.55
II. IN RE COLONIAL REALTY CO.1
6
A. Facts
Colonial Realty Company, a Connecticut general partner-
ship and its partners, Jonathan Googel and Benjamin Sisti,
promoted numerous real estate limited partnerships through-
out the United States during the 1980s."7 Googel and Sisti
acted as general and/or managing partners of the limited part-
nerships.5 8 The limited partnerships were financed by direct
borrowings from financial institutions and from funds invested
by third parties.5 9 In turn, Colonial, Googel and Sisti guaran-
teed many of the loans to these ventures, becoming subject to
contingent guarantor liability of tens of millions of dollars."
Between March and August 1990, Sisti transferred approx-
imately $10 million in cash under his control to third par-
ties."' Several million dollars allegedly went to Sisti's wife,
" Id. § 507(a)(8).
" Section 365(o) states in part: "In a case under chapter 11 of this title, the
trustee [or debtor in possession] shall be deemed to have assumed . . . and shall
immediately cure any deficit under, any commitment by the debtor to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . to maintain the capital of an insured deposito-
ry institution .... " The Bankruptcy Code contains no other "deemed assumption"
clauses.
5 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992).
', Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 127.
68 Id.
Id.
60 Id.; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 11.
6, Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 128 n.3; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note
42, at 12. The complaint in the Florida action describes the following transfers:
1. On or about March 26, 1990, when a certificate of deposit in the amount
of $1.7 million in the name of and owned by Sisti matured at a bank in Con-
necticut, $1 million was transferred to Barnett Bank in Florida with instruc-
tions to open an account for it in Helene's name.
2. On or about April 4, 1990, when a certificate of deposit in the amount of
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who in turn transferred a large portion of those funds to their
son and to two Florida corporations that the wife owned and
controlled-Panda Angel and Martin Marina.62 Sisti also
transferred funds to a Florida corporation, Southern Ties,
which in turn transferred the funds to a Florida law firm, the
"Cohen Firm."
63
In September 1990, midway through the real estate reces-
sion, involuntary bankruptcy petitions were filed against Colo-
nial, Googel and Sisti (together, the "Debtors") in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut.' A
Chapter 7 trustee was appointed for the Debtors, who, after a
trial on the issue, were substantively consolidated.65
$3.8 million in the name of and owned by Sisti matured at the same bank in
Connecticut, such amount was transferred to Barnett Bank in Florida with
instructions to open a certificate of deposit in the same amount in Helene's
name.
3. On or about April 5, 1990, when a certificate of deposit in the amount of
$228,000 in the name of and owned by Sisti matured at the same bank in
Connecticut, such amount was transferred to a certificate of deposit in the
same amount in Helene's name at the same bank.
4. On or about April 9, 1990, when a certificate of deposit in the amount of
$365,000 in the name of and owned by Sisti matured at the same bank in
Connecticut, such amount was transferred to a certificate of deposit in the
same amount in Helene's name at the same bank. Upon maturity, these
funds were placed in Helene's money market account.
5. On or about May 4, 1990, Sisti transferred $560,000 from his demand ac-
count at a Connecticut bank to an account in the name of Southern Ties at
Barnett Bank in Florida.
6. On or about May 16, 1990, Sisti transferred $4 million from his account
at an Illinois bank to an account in the name of Helene at the Connecticut
bank. Later, $3 million was transferred to an account in Helene's name at
Barnett Bank in Florida, and the other $1 million was transferred to another
account in Helene's name at the Connecticut bank.
Complaint, FDIC v. Sisti (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 1991) (No. 91-7866).
All of these transfers were followed by further transfers of the same funds to
the Cohen Firm, Southern Ties, Panda Angel and Martin Marina, and also used to
purchase certain real property in Florida.
2 Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 12. Panda Angel and Martin Marina
each purchased trailer parks with the funds (totaling over $6 million). Id. at 13.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 13.
" Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 127.
6' See FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992). The trial deci-
sion on substantive consolidation was appealed by the FDIC to the district court
and to the court of appeals, where it was affirmed.
Substantive consolidation results in the pooling of the assets and liabilities of
the substantively consolidated debtors, who are treated as if they were a single
entity. It is an equitable doctrine based on a number of factors pertaining to the
ultimate fairness of requiring a creditor to satisfy her claim against only one debt-
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1. Enter the FDIC
Within one year of Colonial's collapse and the commence-
ment of the Debtors' bankruptcy cases, the FDIC was appoint-
ed as receiver for five failed banks that were owed nearly $70
million from the Debtors.66 The FDIC actively participated in
the bankruptcy cases.67
The trustee, attempting to carry out his duties to locate
and marshal property of the estate, had sought discovery
through the FDIC of certain suspicious transfers from the
Debtors to the banks. The FDIC blocked the trustee's efforts,
claiming that the banks' records were in disarray and that the
FDIC did not have the time nor the manpower to facilitate the
discovery.6 As described below, the FDIC had reason to
stonewall the trustee's discovery efforts.
2. The Florida Action
On December 2, 1991, the FDIC, in its role as receiver for
the banks, commenced an action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida to contest the trans-
fer of and, if successful, to recover approximately $10 million
that Sisti had transferred to third parties, including his
wife. 9 The action was brought under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17),
which permits the avoidance and recovery of any transfer "that
was intended to hinder, delay, or defraud an insured deposito-
ry institution or the FDIC as receiver.., if the transfer was
made within five years from the date that the FDIC was ap-
pointed receiver [of] the institution.""
or when that creditor dealt with several debtors as a single economic entity with-
out separate identity when extending credit.
" Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 127.
67 Id.
"8 See Trustee's Application in Support of Motion Upon Short Notice Pursuant
to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(c) Enforcing the Automatic Stay as Against the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation at 5-6, FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.),
980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 92-5023).
" Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 127-28.
70 Id. Section 1821(d)(17) provides, in relevant part:
(A) In general
The [FDIC], as conservator or receiver for any insured depository
institution, . . . may avoid a transfer of any interest of. . . any person
who the [FDIC] determines is a debtor of the institution, in proper-
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Named as defendants in the action were Sisti's wife and
son, Southern Ties and the Cohen Firm. Sisti and the trustee,
however, "were not named as defendants in or served with the
complaint, and neither they nor the bankruptcy court were
notified of the commencement of the action.7' On December
12, 1991, the district court entered an ex parte temporary re-
straining order freezing the transferred assets and appointed a
trustee under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(18).72 The trustee received
notice via telephone of the action on December 13, 1991.73
3. The Lower Court Hearings
On December 16, 1991, at a hearing commenced by the
trustee, the bankruptcy court ruled that the FDIC's actions
were subject to the automatic stay.74 Because the bankruptcy
court was left with the impression that the FDIC would not
abide the court's ruling on the automatic stay's applicability,
the court issued an injunction under its section 105 powers
enjoining the action.75 The bankruptcy court issued a written
order one day later, and a written decision on December 24,
1991.76 The bankruptcy court's view may be summarized by
two quotes from its decision:
ty, . . . that was made within 5 years of the date on which the [FDIC]
was appointed conservator or receiver if such . .. person voluntarily or
involuntarily made such transfer... with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud the insured depository institution, [or] the [FDIC].
(D) Rights under this paragraph
The rights under this paragraph of the [FDIC] . . . shall be superior
to any, rights of a trustee or any other party (other than a party which
is a Federal agency) under Title 11.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17).
"' Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 127-28; see also Brief for Appellee at 4, FDIC v.
Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 92-5023).
72 Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 128. The FDIC-receiver is empowered to obtain
attachment of assets and other injunctive relief pursuant to the relaxed standards
set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(19). See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(18).
"' A facsimile was sent by Florida counsel to the Sistis. Brief for Appellee,
supra note 71, at 3.
"' In re Colonial Realty Co., 134 B.R. 1017, 1020-23 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991)
[hereinafter Colonial I].
" Id. at 1023 n.9. Bankruptcy courts have a broad grant of authority to issue
any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions and purposes of Title 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
76 Colonial I, 134 B.R. at 1024.
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It is well settled that fraudulent conveyance actions based upon pre-
petition transfers by a debtor are property of the estate; that the
estate trustee has exclusive authority to maintain such actions, and
that the automatic stay bars all other parties from pursuing such
actions unless relief from the stay is sought in and granted by the
bankruptcy court.7
The overarching point is that the forum that Congress provided
for the trustee and all parties, without exception, making a claim to
estate property is the bankruptcy court.78
On December 30, 1991, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York entered an oral order,
followed by a written order dated December 31, 1991, that
affirmed the bankruptcy court.v9 The FDIC then appealed to
the Second Circuit.
B. Issues Presented to the Second Circuit
The FDIC's appeal to the Second Circuit requested a de-
termination on three separate issues. First, the FDIC asserted
that its section 1821(d)(17) action was not property of the
bankruptcy estate nor subject to the automatic stay.80 Alter-
natively, the FDIC claimed that section 1821(d)(17)(D) preclud-
ed application of the automatic stay by designating the FDIC's
rights to transferred assets as superior to those of the trust-
ee"' and, therefore, the transferred property did not belong to
the bankruptcy estate to the extent of the FDIC's claim.
Finally, the FDIC asked the court to find that the opera-
tion of the section 362 stay and the section 105 injunction was
ineffective against the FDIC in the light of the anti-injunction
71 Id. at 1020.
78 Id. at 1022.
7 Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 130; see also Brief for Appellee, supra note 71,
at 5.
"' On appeal to the Second Circuit, there was general agreement that the
FDIC's fraudulent transfer claim, itself, was not property of the estate. Colonial
Realty, 980 F.2d at 131. Because that action was exclusive to the FDIC and the
assets to be recovered by such action would inure to the benefit of the FDIC only,
the bankruptcy trustee could not step into the FDIC's shoes under § 544(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 544(b) permits a trustee to exercise the rights of an
unsecured creditor and to avoid any transfer voidable under applicable law by
such unsecured creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).
8 See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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provision found at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j). This provision precludes
any court from restraining or affecting the exercise of powers
or functions of the FDIC as receiver."
The trustee's arguments were straightforward. In response
to the first two issues, the trustee relied on the broad defini-
tion of "property of the estate" contained in section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code and case law. Arguing that fraudulently con-
veyed property belongs to the estate, the trustee characterized
the FDIC's Florida action as an act to obtain possession of pro-
perty of the estate, which was prohibited by the automatic
stay.83 The trustee addressed the third issue by arguing that
the section 362 stay is not a judicial act but a congressionally
mandated stay applicable by operation of law and, further-
more, that section 1821(j) is applicable only when the FDIC is
acting within the proper scope of its authority. Because the
FDIC was acting outside the scope of its authority-i.e., in
violation of the automatic stay-the lower courts' issuance and
affirmation of the section 105 injunction were proper.'
1. Applicability of the Automatic Stay to the Florida
Action
On appeal, the FDIC argued that the rights granted under
section 1821(d)(17) are exclusive to the FDIC and expressly
"superior" to the rights of a bankruptcy trustee; therefore, the
automatic stay was inapplicable to the Florida action.85 Under
section 1821(d)(17)(A) the FDIC alone has the right to avoid
certain transfers of interests in property, and obligations in-
curred by, among others, debtors of an FDIC-insured institu-
tion.8" Section 1821(d)(17)(A) imposes only two limitations on
2 Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 130; see also supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
8 980 F.2d at 129; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
, Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 129.
85 Id.
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 18. These powers also are granted to
the RTC, which exists under the auspices of the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). The exclusivity of these fraudulent transfer avoidance
powers differs from traditional state law fraudulent transfer (or conveyance) laws,
which generally give the debtor or any of its creditors the right to bring such
actions. In bankruptcy, a trustee (or the debtor in possession) succeeds to these
state law rights by virtue of § 544 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).
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the FDIC's avoidance power. First, the transfer must have
been made or the obligation incurred within five years of the
FDIC's appointment as receiver. Second, the transfer must
have been made or the obligation incurred with the intent to
hinder, delay or defraud either the insured depository institu-
tion, the receiver or a federal banking agency.87
The FDIC also argued that section 1821(d)(17)(D) makes
the FDIC's rights to avoid and recover fraudulently transferred
property or its value "superior to any rights of a trustee or any
other party (other than a party that is a Federal agency) under
Title Ui."8
The FDIC relied on statutory construction. First, it assert-
ed that the plain language of the statute should be given ef-
fect.89 Here, the statute was unambiguous, expressly stating
the FDIC's rights without reference to or a caveat concerning
an intervening bankruptcy. ° The FDIC also argued that be-
cause its avoidance rights flowed from a "specific" statute, the
"general" law of the automatic stay and bankruptcy estate
property must give way.91
In response, the trustee argued that the automatic stay
applied because the transferred property belonged to the bank-
ruptcy estate.92 The trustee relied on the Bankruptcy Code's
broad definition of property of the estate, which includes "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case."93 The trustee also relied on
'7 Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 18; see also Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d
at 128.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(D).
8' Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 15-16; see also Colonial Realty, 980
F.2d at 134.
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 16; see also Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d
at 134. According to the FDIC, because the automatic stay and bankruptcy-estate
property concepts are very old, Congress was well aware of them and would have
carved them out from the FDIC's avoidance powers if that was what it had in-
tended. The more commonly recognized statutory construction would argue that an
older law is never altered by a newer law unless they are completely incompatible
or there is an express indication that Congress intended the latter law to control.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 20-23; see also Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at
132-33.
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 28; see also Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d
at 129.
92 Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 25; see also Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d
at 131.
'" 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
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American National Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp., a Fifth
Circuit decision holding that a debtor retains some legal or
equitable interest in fraudulently transferred property that
precludes the debtor/fraudulent transferor's creditors from
pursuing claims against that property outside the bankruptcy
case.94 Finally, the trustee argued that the FDIC's "superior
rights" merely established the FDIC's priority in the assets
once the trustee recovered them through use of his avoiding
powers under sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code,
much like the priority positions of an administrative or secured
creditor.95
The Second Circuit first addressed the "straight bankrupt-
cy" issue presented by the case. It began by discussing the
MortgageAmerica case, which expressed the "traditional" view
that the debtor retains some interest in fraudulently trans-
ferred property. The Second Circuit stated that the Mortgage-
America analysis was seriously flawed, notwithstanding sever-
al earlier Second Circuit cases that had affirmed its reason-
ing.9" Specifically, the Second Circuit determined that applica-
tion of MortgageAmerica's section 541(a)(1) analysis would
render meaningless section 541(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy
Code. 7 Section 541(a)(3) includes recovered property as part
of the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that unrecovered, fraudulently transferred property
must not be property of the estate under section 541(a)(1).9"
" American Nat'l Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica
Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983).
Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 129, 134.
' See id. at 131. The Second Circuit relied upon the bankruptcy court's deci-
sion in In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989), in reaching its con-
clusion about MortgageAmerica. Id.
" Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 131. As noted earlier, § 541(a)(1), entitled
"Property of the Estate," includes "equitable interests of the debtor in property as
of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added). The
MortgageAmerica court had stated that even where fraudulent transfer causes of
action can only be brought by the creditors of the debtor/fraudulent transferor and
the transferee holds colorable title to the assets, "the equitable interest-at least as
far as the creditors (but not the debtor) are concerned-is considered to remain in
the debtor so that the creditors may attach or execute judgment upon it."
MortgageAmerica, 714 F.2d at 1275 (emphasis added).
'a 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 541(a)(3) provides that
property recovered through §§ 544 and 548 avoidance powers becomes part of the




This ruling, the first by a court of appeals, establishes that
fraudulently transferred property is not property of the estate
until it is recovered.99 Accordingly, the trustee's argument,
that the Florida action violated the automatic stay as an at-
tempt to possess property of the estate, failed.
Not all was lost for the trustee, however, because the Sec-
ond Circuit determined the FDIC was trying "to recover a
claim against the debtor," in violation of the automatic
stay.' Subsection one of section 362(a)'provides in part that
actions "to recover a claim against the debtor that arose prior
to the commencement" of the bankruptcy case are stayed.1"'
Because subsection one in its first part stays actions "against
the debtor," the Second Circuit concluded that the second part
of the subsection---"to recover a claim against the debt-
or"-must encompass cases in which the debtor is not a defen-
dant; for instance, in a fraudulent transfer action against a
third party.0 2 In its conclusion, the Second Circuit quoted
the "issuance of process" hypothetical from In re Saunders, a
Florida bankruptcy court decision:
While a fraudulent transfer action may be an action against a third
party, it is also an action "to recover a claim against the debtor."
Absent a claim against the debtor, there is no independent basis for
the action against the transferee. Moreover, the creditor can only
recover property or value thereof received from the debtor sufficient
to satisfy the creditor's claim against the debtor. This interpretation
is consistent with the legislative history of section 362(a)(1) which
states:
The provision in this first paragraph prohibiting the issuance
of process is designed to prevent the issuance of a writ of exe-
cution by a judgment creditor of the debtor to obtain property
that was property of the debtor before the case but that was
transferred, subject to the judgment lien, before the case. Be-
cause the other paragraphs of this subsection refer only to
property of the estate or property of the debtor, neither of
which apply to this kind of transferred property, they would
not prohibit pursuit of the transferred property by issuance of
process."3
Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 131.
1"0 Id. at 131-32.
10 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
102 Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 131.
" Id. at 132 (quoting In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305-06 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1989) (citations omitted)).
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The Second Circuit applied this analysis to the FDIC's
Florida action. The FDIC's complaint against the fraudulent
transferees stated that the FDIC was seeking to recover a
claim against a debtor, Sisti, because Sisti was liable to the
FDIC as the result of loans made by the failed banks. The
defendants in the action were liable only as fraudulent
transferees. 1 4 Accordingly, if Sisti were not liable to the
FDIC, the FDIC would have no cause of action against the
fraudulent transferees. 5 Thus, the Second Circuit held that
the automatic stay was applicable to the Florida action unless
it was trumped by the provisions of section 1821 of the
FDIA 10
6
The Second Circuit next addressed the FDIC's statutory
construction arguments.1"7 The FDIC had argued that the ab-
sence of any bankruptcy carve-out to section 1821(d)(17) enact-
ed in 1990 meant that the FDIC's fraudulent transfer rights
were not subject to the automatic stay.' 8 The Second Circuit
stated two reasons for rejecting this "partial-repeal-by-implica-
tion" argument.1"9 First, repeal requires either some affirma-
tive showing of an intent to repeal, or proof that the two stat-
utes are completely irreconcilable."0 Second, courts should
reconcile the inconsistent requirements of two statutes wherev-
er possible."'
In applying the first prong of the "repeal analysis," the
Second Circuit turned the FDIC's argument on its head. The
court highlighted the 1990 Amendments,"' concluding: "Giv-
en this careful attention to the harmonization of the new bank-
ing provisions with the existing Bankruptcy Code, it becomes
especially implausible to conclude that a quite significant modi-
fication of the bankruptcy automatic stay was enacted by im-




" Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 132.
108 Id.
'09 Id. at 132-33.
11o Id.
111 Id.
"' See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
.. Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 133 (emphasis added).
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sion of the salutary purposes of the automatic stay."4 The
automatic stay prevents "'a chaotic and uncontrolled scramble
for the debtor's assets,"' and facilitates the centralization of
the debtor's affairs in a single forum resulting in an organized
proceeding." 5
Next, the Second Circuit agreed with the trustee's view
that the FDIC's "superior" rights in the recovered property
merely established the FDIC's priority of recovery."6 The
court stated that although the FDIC's rights to the property
were superior, the rights and obligations of the trustee were
not extinguished."' If the FDIC were free to sue fraudulent
transfer recipients without notice to bankruptcy trustees,
trustees would be placed in the intolerable position of expend-
ing time and money to uncover FDIC actions throughout the
country, in order to intervene in each forum to protect the
rights of bankruptcy estates."' The ramifications of such a
scenario run afoul of fundamental bankruptcy policy; namely,
that any matters affecting the debtor's affairs "'be centralized,
[at least] initially, in a single forum in order to prevent con-
flicting judgments from different courts and in to order to har-
monize all of the creditors' interests with one another.' ""9
Ultimately, the Second Circuit determined that both of the
statutory provisions, section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code and
section 1821(d)(17) of the Act, could be given effect.'2 ° The
FDIC could request relief from the automatic stay to com-
mence any action, and also could request equitable (injunctive)
relief on an expedited basis. 2' The automatic stay could
serve its centralization function and the bankruptcy trustee
(and estate) would receive appropriate due process.
114 Id.
' Id. (quoting In re Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977)).
116 Id. at 134.
117 Id.
. Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 134.
. Id. at 133 (quoting In re Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 550 F.2d at 55).
121 Id. at 135.
121 Id. at 134.
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2. Applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act
Because the FDIC had suggested that it did not agree with
the bankruptcy court's application of the automatic stay, the
bankruptcy court issued an injunction under its section 105
powers. 22 The FDIC appealed the injunction as a contraven-
tion of the anti-injunction provision of Act section 1821(j).' 2
The FDIC exhorted that the plain, unambiguous language and
meaning of the statute was controlling, and cited several cases
showing that similar anti-injunction statutes were applicable
in bankruptcy proceedings.'
According to the FDIC, the Supreme Court's decision in
Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 25 provided the
most recent guidance in this area. In MCorp, a bank holding
company, which had filed for Chapter 11 protection, sought to
enjoin two proceedings brought against it by the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System. 26 The district court
issued the injunction despite the Board's argument that it was
void in light of the anti-injunction provision applicable to such
proceedings. 27 The Fifth Circuit partially reversed the dis-
trict court, grounding its holding on the anti-injunction provi-
sion. 28 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and
, See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
1 Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 135; see supra note 81.
124 See, e.g., Petrusch v. Teamsters Local 317 (In re Petrusch), 667 F.2d 297,
299-300 (2d Cir. 1981) (bankruptcy court without subject matter jurisdiction to
issue injunction restraining labor union from picketing debtor's place of business
because the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited such an injunction), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 974 (1982); Third Ave. Transit Corp. v. Quill (In re Third Ave. Transit Corp.),
192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1951) (same).
1- 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
128 Id. at 461.
12 Id. The anti-injunction provision states:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section no court shall have juris-
diction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of
any notice or order under this section, or to review, modify, suspend,
terminate, or set aside any such notice or order.
12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1 MCorp, 112 S. Ct. at 461. The Fifth Circuit held that, in light of the appli-
cable anti-injunction statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1), the district court was without
jurisdiction to enjoin one of the Board proceedings dealing with restrictions on
transactions between bank holding-company subsidiaries and nonbank affiliates.
112 S. Ct. at 461 n.2, 462. The Court of Appeals, however, remanded to the dis-
trict court the second Board proceeding concerning the "source-of-strength" regu-
lation, with instructions to enjoin that proceeding for its lack of proper statutory
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reversed in part, primarily on the ground that the Board's
administrative proceedings were excepted from the operation of
the automatic stay by virtue of the police and regulatory pow-
ers exception.'29 The Court, however, noted in dicta that "the
specific preclusive language in [the anti-injunction provision] is
not qualified or superseded by the general provisions governing
bankruptcy proceedings on which MCorp relies."30 The FDIC
argued that this statement by the Supreme Court expressly
recognized that the anti-injunction provision was applicable in
bankruptcy cases.
The FDIC cited other case law analogues, including sever-
al that discussed the "trumping" of a "general" statute by a
"specific" statute. 3 ' The FDIC's theory was that the automat-
ic stay was a statute of broad and "general" application, with-
out any specific reference to FDIC proceedings, whereas the
anti-injunction provision of section 1821(j) was a "specific"
statement by Congress that no court should act to enjoin the
FDIC in the furtherance of its powers and duties."2
In response, the trustee argued that the injunction was
issued solely in support of the automatic stay, which is the
result of congressional mandate, not judicial action.'33 The
trustee then cited an extensive line of cases, most of which
stood for the proposition that anti-injunction laws are inappli-
cable when the entity benefitted by the law acts beyond the
scope of its power or authority."4 Those cases also establish
authority. Id. at 462.
1'2 112 S. Ct. at 464. The Bankruptcy Code excepts from the operation of the
automatic stay "the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power."
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
' MCorp, 112 S. Ct. at 465. Because the Court already had ruled on the ap-
plicability of § 362(b)(4), the Court's statement might have been directed solely at
MCorp's alternative argument that the district (or bankruptcy) court had authority
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over certain bank-
ruptcy-related civil proceedings that otherwise would be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of another court. Id.
... See, e.g., Cook County Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445, 451 (1883)
("A law embracing an entire subject, dealing with it in all its phases, may thus
withdraw the subject from the operation of a general law as effectually as though,
as to such subject, the general law were in terms repealed.").
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 43.
.. Brief for Appellee, supra note 71, at 30.
34 See, e.g., Cummings Prop. Mgmt. v. FDIC, 786 F. Supp. 144 (D. Mass. 1992)
(section 1821(j) does not divest court of jurisdiction to determine if FDIC is acting
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that such laws do not prevent a court from determining wheth-
er the "protected" entity is acting within its proper scope." 5
On the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act, the Second
Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court's issuance of the
injunction was superfluous since the automatic stay covered
the Florida action.'36 Agreeing with the trustee, the court
opined that section 1821(j) was ineffective against a congressio-
nally mandated stay.'37 The Court of Appeals next reviewed
several of the cases relied upon by the parties. 3 '
It summarily dismissed the FDIC's MCorp argument be-
cause it found that the Supreme Court's holding in MCorp was
grounded primarily in the police and regulatory exception to
the automatic stay.3 9 Next, the court addressed Coit Inde-
pendence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Co., '4 in which the Supreme Court found the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation's ("FSLIC") anti-injunc-
tion provision inapplicable when the FSLIC was acting beyond
the scope of its powers because it attempted to adjudicate
creditors' claims.' Thus, the Second Circuit found this case
inapposite as well.'
Finally, the Court turned its attention to Gross v. Bell
Savings Bank,' a Third Circuit decision holding that injunc-
tive relief imposed by statute without court action does not
contravene an anti-injunction provision.' This dovetailed
with the Second Circuit's determination that the Colonial Real-
ty injunction was superfluous in the first place, and had been
outside the scope of its powers), vacated and appeal dismissed, No. 92-1504, 1992
WL 366909 (1st Cir. Sept. 1, 1992); Gross v. RTC, No. 92-0296, 1992 WL 55741
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1992) (section 1821(j) does not prohibit court determination of
whether RTC is acting outside the scope of its powers), rev'd sub nom., Gross v.
Bell Savs. Bank, 974 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Lane, 136 B.R. 319 (D. Mass.
1992) (appellate court can reissue automatic stay despite § 1821(j)).
'3 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 71, at 32-38.
130 Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 136 n.10, 137.
' Id. at 137.
138 See id. at 135-37.
'-' Id. at 135.
,, 489 U.S. 561 (1989).
4 Id. at 575.
142 Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 135. The court reviewed other cases, finding
none particularly applicable.
' 974 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1992) (RTC permitted to withhold pension and profit-
sharing assets from bank insiders).
14 Id. at 407.
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imposed only because of the FDIC's aggressive response to the
bankruptcy court's ruling on the applicability of the automatic
stay.1
45
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION
Colonial Realty is important because it reconciles ostensi-
bly inconsistent provisions of bankruptcy law and bank insol-
vency law without adversely impacting the policies or goals of
either. Colonial Realty's significance to bankruptcy practice in
general, however, transcends that effect.
By adopting the reasoning of In re Saunders,4 ' the Colo-
nial Realty court rejected the commonly held view of bankrupt-
cy case law and commentary that a bankruptcy debtor retains
at least an equitable interest in fraudulently transferred prop-
erty and that the automatic stay may be used to protect this
interest.4 7 Under this theory, most often credited to the Fifth
Circuit's MortgageAmerica decision, direct creditor action
against the recipients of fraudulent property transfers is pre-
cluded. " Only the debtor or its trustee may pursue avoid-
ance of the transfer and recovery of the property or its value
for the benefit of all creditors.4
At first blush, the reasoning of MortgageAmerica and its
progeny appears sound because its result is salutary and con-
sistent with fundamental bankruptcy policies. As highlighted
by the Second Circuit, however, if MortgageAmerica were cor-
rect, it would render meaningless the Bankruptcy Code section
that expressly includes recovered property within the bank-
ruptcy estate.5 ' Such a result is contrary to basic principles
of statutory construction.
Legislative history supports the Second Circuit's conclu-
14 Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 136 n.10, 137.
146 101 B.R. 303 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989); see also supra text accompanying
notes 102-05.
" See Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 131; see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 15, IT
541.10[81 n.28, 541.16 n.5a; DANIEL R. COWANS ET AL., BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE § 9.2(h) nn.24-25 (6th ed. 1994).
1' American Nat'l Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica
Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983).
.. Id. at 1275-76.
... Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 131; see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying
text.
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sion that property of the estate does not include fraudulently
transferred assets until they are recovered. The Bankruptcy
Act of 1898,' the foundation of modern bankruptcy law, in-
cluded a provision that gave title to the trustee of "property
transferred by [the debtor] in fraud of his creditors."'52 The
commentators viewed this section of the 1898 Act, section
70a(4), as meaning that property recovered by avoiding fraudu-
lent transfers would be included in the estate. 3 The Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1973 enacted the commentators' view by remov-
ing what had been section 70a(4), and adding a section provid-
ing that fraudulently transferred property becomes property of
the estate after its recovery.5 4 This section has remained un-
changed since the amendment.'
... The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 565 [hereinafter 1898 Act].
... Id. § 70a(4); see also 4A COLLIER, supra note 15, % 70.03[1] at 28; HOWARD
L. OLECK, DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 69, at 268 (1986); Vern Countryman, The
Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 434 n.172
(1972).
'5 4A COLLIER, supra note 15, 170.14[1] at 127. One commentator noted:
clause 4 of § 70a . .. is somewhat superfluous [because the avoidance
powers of the trustee already stated that fraudulently transferred proper-
ty could be recovered for the benefit of the estate] . . . except that it
does clearly indicate a general intent to include all fraudulently trans-
ferred property as a part of the bankrupt estate available for distribution
to all creditors, provided there is an avoidance of such transfer.
Id. at 131 (emphasis added). Similarly, if § 70a(4)
were taken literally, it would automatically endow the trustee with com-
plete title to property fraudulently transferred and consequently would
cut off even bona fide transferees .. . [a]s indicated previously, § 70a(4)
does not avoid or render void any transfer, but merely indicates the
trustees right to act under the applicable provisions of the statute
[avoidance powers] for the benefit of the estate.
Id. at 131; see also In re Locks, 104 F. 783 (W.D.N.Y. 1900) ("Property does not
vest in the trustee [under § 70a(4)] until there has been an adjudication setting
aside the transfer."); OLECK, supra note 152, at 268 ("[Section 70a(4)] seems to
refer to any interest therein remaining in the bankrupt. Fraudulent transfers . ..
are voidable, not void, and this section empowers the trustee to set them aside for
the benefit of the estate.").
Congress made [an error] in the original Act in section 70a(4) by giving
the trustee the title of the bankrupt to property which he has fraudu-
lently conveyed although the bankrupt has no interest in property he has
fraudulently conveyed. Section 70a(4) should be repealed. Given the
trustees present power to avoid fraudulent conveyances[,] . . . it serves
no useful purpose.
Countryman, supra note 152, at 436.
.. See Commission Report, supra note 15, at 147 n.2; 2 COLLIER, supra note
15, at 192, 194 (Commission notes the adoption of Professor Countryman's rea-
soning with respect to the § 70a(4) problem).
... See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 541 (1977); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st
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The Colonial Realty and Saunders courts also relied on the
language of section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code in their
"to-recover-a-claim" analysis under section 362(a)(1)." 6 The
legislative history for this clause is sparse.157 The "issuance-of-
process" hypothetical, is all that can be found. 5 ' The existing
legislative history suggested that the phrase "to recover a
claim" was included to prevent creditors from circumventing or
running afoul of the stay by issuing process against the trans-
ferred property.'59 Both the Colonial Realty and Saunders de-
cisions, however, omitted the last sentence of that paragraph,
which helped clarify this understanding:
Thus, the prohibition in this paragraph [(issuance of process)] is
included and the judgment creditor is allowed to proceed by way of
foreclosure against the property, but not by a general writ of execu-
tion (in the State court, or wherever the creditor obtained the judg-
Sess. § 541; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541.
1" See Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 131; In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305
(Bankr. N.D. Fla 1989).
1"7 A review of the legislative history of the phrase "to recover a claim" is not
particularly enlightening. First, H.R. 8200 did not include the "to recover a claim"
language in the current section, but did include such a phrase in another subsec-
tion staying "any act to collect, assess or recover a claim against the debtor (pro-
posed § 362(a)(6), found in current § 362(a)(6))". In addition, the proposed §
362(a)(6) has been described as preventing "creditors from attempting in any way
to collect a pre-petition debt. Creditors in consumer cases occasionally telephone
debtors to encourage repayment in spite of bankruptcy .... This provision pre-
vents evasion of the purpose of the bankruptcy laws by sophisticated creditors."
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6298. The "to recover a claim" language was added to §
362(a)(1), however. See S. 2266 § 541. The senate version, S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1978), reprinted in 1978 541. U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5836-37,
essentially adopts the House version of subsection (a)(6) and repeats the comments
of the House on the necessity of the subsection. Also, when describing subsection
(a)(1), the Senate report does not mention anything about recovering a claim
against the debtor or its addition to the Senate version. S. REP. No. 989 at 50,
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5836-37. Finally, the Congressional Record reports that the
House
adopts the [(a)(1)] provision contained in the Senate amendment enjoining
the commencement or continuation of a judicial, administrative, or other
proceeding to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case. The provision is beneficial and interacts with
section 362(a)(6), which also covers assessment, to prevent harassment of
the debtor with respect to pre-petition claims.
124 CONG. REC. H11092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
... See supra text accompanying note 103.
... See supra note 157.
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ment) against the debtor and all of the debtor's property.16
Thus, taken as a whole, the legislative history explains that, in
addition to barring the commencement of a judicial, adminis-
trative or other action or proceeding, the stay precludes a judg-
ment creditor whose lien attached to property before transfer
from using the general writ of execution procedure to recover
the transferred property. The comment is also an instruction to
the judgment lienor that simple foreclosure of its lien on the
transferred property (remember, it was transferred "subject
to") is permissible.
The drafters may have been concerned that before "issu-
ance of process" was added, certain subsections of section 362,
those which only discussed actions against the debtor or "prop-
erty of the estate," were not sufficiently specific on the extent
of the stay's protection. For instance, even if the creditor only
had the intention of levying against the transferred property
(which would not be property of the estate), a general writ of
execution would automatically be issued by the court clerk
against all of the debtor's property. This action potentially
could lead to confusion and error by the levying sheriff, and
needlessly involve the debtor in the process by naming the
debtor in the writ.
This background illuminates the strength of the Colonial
Realty and Saunders analyses. Section 541(a)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not include property fraudulently transferred
by the debtor, otherwise section 541(a)(3) would be meaning-
less, and section 362(a)(1)'s "to-recover-a-claim" language must
mean something different from the remainder of the section
concerning actions "against the debtor." MortgageAmerica and
its progeny, on the other hand, strained to determine that the
debtor retained "some legal or equitable interest" in fraudu-
lently transferred property. Those cases failed to seize upon
the differences between actions directed at the debtor and
those to recover a claim against the debtor. Lacking this latter
analysis, it is likely that the MortgageAmerica court believed
that the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy (i.e., "equality of
distribution" and avoiding the "race to the court") would be
thwarted.'6 ' Creditors simply would begin a new race against
I- H.R. REP. No. 595, at 341, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297-98.
.61 American Natl Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica), 714
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the assets held by the fraudulent transferee, with recovery on
a first-come-first-served basis.'62 Colonial Realty establishes
that there is no need for such a strained analysis, while clari-
fying the operation of the automatic stay in such circumstanc-
es.
163
Once Colonial Realty reached beyond these "straight bank-
ruptcy" issues, the court's analysis of the applicability of the
automatic stay to the Florida action was persuasive. As the
court explained, Congress certainly was aware of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and its processes when it enacted the bulk of the
superpowers. The 1990 Amendments, which bolstered and
clarified the impact of federal banking law in bankruptcy cas-
es, prove the reverse-that Congress likewise would have
amended the automatic stay if it intended to free the FDIC's
fraudulent transfer avoidance rights from the stay's strictures.
And, as the Second Circuit recognized, the FDIC had the abili-
ty to request relief from the automatic stay.
In its appellate briefs, the FDIC registered its fear that it
would not get fair treatment from the bankruptcy court on a
request for relief from the stay.' The Second Circuit did not
directly address this fear, but did note that the FDIC could
move to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court and
seek relief in the district court. 165
F.2d 1266, 1274 (5th Cir. 1983); see supra text accompanying note 16.
162 Id.
13 Although Saunders and Colonial Realty shed light on one of the basic flaws
in the MortgageAmerica analysis, a further review demonstrates that it was flawed
in another sense as well. Namely, if property of the estate included fraudulently
transferred property, the transferees would have to turnover such property pursu-
ant to Bankruptcy Code § 542 and an avoidance action would be unnecessary.
16 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 42, at 36; Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appel-
lants at 10, FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir.
1992) (No. 92-5023). The FDIC's fear was based in part on the bankruptcy court's
decision, which stated that at a stay relief hearing the trustee could make inqui-
ries into the FDIC's claims against the alleged transferees and inquire whether
any other recovery alternatives were available to the FDIC so that the estate
would not be deprived needlessly of a recovery. Colonial I, 134 B.R. 1017, 1022
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). The bankruptcy court also mentioned the possible applica-
tion of the marshaling doctrine, which provides that a creditor with two funds
from which to satisfy its claim may not apply the funds in such a way as to de-
feat unnecessarily the claims of another creditor who may resort to only one of
the funds for recovery. Id.
" Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 134. The court also noted that such a request
for withdrawal of the reference should be granted since withdrawal under 28
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From a "balance of the equities" approach, if the FDIC's
pursuit of fraudulent transfer claims were exempt from the
automatic stay, the harm that would be suffered by the bank-
ruptcy estate would considerably outweigh any inconveniences
faced by the FDIC as a result of the automatic stay. If the stay
did not apply, the trustee would-have the near-impossible task
of monitoring the nation's courts to ascertain whether the
FDIC's litigation efforts would impact the estate's ability to
recover assets. This is contrary to the fundamental bankruptcy
policy of centralizing the resolution of the debtor's affairs in
one forum. The Second Circuit recognized the import of this
policy. The FDIC's valuation and disposition of the assets it
recovers also would impact a trustee's marshaling of the
debtor's assets, as the trustee would be forced to accept the
FDIC's numbers. Additionally, if the FDIC released a trans-
feree, it is not clear what effect that release would have on the
trustee's right of recovery in light of the FDIC's "superior"
right in that regard.
On the other hand, the FDIC suffers far less harm from
the stay as compared with other creditors. As noted, the FDIC
may move for relief from the stay and (if it is wary of the
bankruptcy court's "agenda") may request that the district
court withdraw its reference to the bankruptcy court. In either
court, the FDIC's "superior" right in the recovered property
will be recognized. Furthermore, the FDIC has significantly
more resources to follow a wide number of bankruptcy cases
than does a typical trustee because it receives significant fund-
ing and recovers before general (non-depositor) creditors from
the failed institutions it manages. Thus, in reality, the auto-
matic stay does not preclude the FDIC from satisfying the
requirements and goals of its statutory scheme. Rather, the
stay prevents the FDIC from acting unnecessarily to the detri-
ment of other creditors.
In Colonial Realty, the FDIC also argued that it would
lose the benefit of specific tools if it were required to first seek
relief from the automatic stay.6 ' These tools, such as the
modified temporary restraining order standards of section
U.S.C. § 157(d) is mandatory when there is a conflict between the Bankruptcy




1821(d)(18)-(19), enable the FDIC to act quickly, enhancing the
likelihood of its recovery. As the Second Circuit pointed out,
however, there is nothing in the Act that would preclude the
bankruptcy court from granting such relief, even on an ex
parte basis.'67 Provided the FDIC made the required show-
ings under its statutory scheme, there is no reason why a
bankruptcy court would be disinclined to grant the requested
relief, particularly because such relief only seeks to maintain
the status quo; it does not harm, and indeed may benefit, the
bankruptcy estate. Thus, by showing the compatibility of the
two statutory schemes, the Second Circuit persuasively demon-
strated that the rights of the FDIC would be protected in
bankruptcy.
The Second Circuit's discussion of the impact of the anti-
injunction provision reveals that the dispute between the FDIC
and the trustee was illusory. In essence, the parties were com-
paring apples to oranges. The FDIC assumed that the auto-
matic stay was not applicable and, therefore, that it needed to
address the injunction issue. The trustee, although he cited the
various injunction/anti-injunction cases, relied on the appli-
cability of the automatic stay, which as a congressionally man-
dated stay did not run afoul of the terms of the FDIC's anti-
injunction statute.
The Second Circuit, however, did review the anti-injunc-
tion cases cited by the parties, and agreed with the holdings of
those courts that the anti-injunction provision permits a court-
ordered restraint only when the FDIC is acting outside the
scope of its authority.'68 While not explicitly stated, the deci-
sion indicates that the Second Circuit would have found the
section 105 injunction in contravention of the FDIA section
1821(j) had it not been based on the automatic stay. The case
law supports that holding.
Two appellate decisions merit comparison with Colonial
Realty on the interaction of the automatic stay and the anti-
injunction provision. Contrary to Colonial Realty, those deci-
sions indicate that the anti-injunction provision of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)(1) supersedes the automatic stay. As described above,
the Supreme Court's decision in MCorp was grounded in its
167 Id.
1" Id. at 135-37.
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determination that the administrative proceedings (regarding
source-of-strength violations) sought to be enjoined by MCorp
were excepted from the automatic stay as the legitimate exer-
cise of a "'governmental unit's police or regulatory power.'"
169
The Court seemed to imply that the enforcement of an admin-
istrative order against a bank holding company in bankruptcy
may not be subject to the automatic stay. The Supreme Court
did state that the mere "possibility" of the entry of an order
affecting the debtor's control over its property was insufficient
to justify the operation of the stay.70 The Court then ac-
knowledged that if such an order were issued, "it may well be
proper for the bankruptcy court to exercise its concurrent ju-
risdiction." 7' Up to this point, the Court's decision appears to
indicate that administrative proceedings, without any enforce-
ment action, are excepted from the automatic stay, but that
enforcement actions likely would be subject to the stay.
Because of its determination of the applicability of the
"police and regulatory power" exception, however, the Court
expressly declined to address the Federal Reserve's Board of
Governors' suggestion that its anti-injunction statute would
preclude application of the automatic stay to an enforcement
action.' After addressing the bankruptcy court's concurrent
jurisdiction over certain bankruptcy-related civil proceedings
handled by other courts and noting that the Board was merely
an administrative agency, the Supreme Court curiously con-
cluded that it "agree[d] ... that the specific preclusive lan-
guage [of the anti-injunction act of] 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) is
not qualified or superseded by the general provisions governing
bankruptcy proceedings on which MCorp relies."'73 It is not
clear whether this statement applies with equal force to en-
forcement actions by the Board or other administrative agen-
cies that otherwise would appear to fall squarely within the
protection of the automatic stay.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Carlton v. Firstcorp, Inc.
interpreted MCorp in just that way.74 In Firstcorp, the debt-
" MCorp, 112 S. Ct. at 464 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 464 n.11 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1)).
173 Id. at 465.
174 967 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1992).
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or-a bank holding company-filed for protection under Chap-
ter 11 and commenced an adversary proceeding against the
Office of Thrift Supervision. Firstcorp sought to restrain the
enforcement of temporary cease and desist orders that required
it to transfer assets to troubled subsidiaries under capital
maintenance agreements.' The Fourth Circuit held that the
automatic stay was superseded by the anti-injunction provision
of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1). 176 The court explained that the en-
forcement against Firstcorp is part of "a unified regulatory
scheme which under MCorp is free from the intrusion of
bankruptcy's automatic stay."177 Finally, in a strong conclud-
ing statement, the Fourth Circuit stated:
[I]t seems clear to us that by devising a comprehensive scheme gov-
erning the oversight of financial institutions, from administrative
control through judicial review of the administrative agency's ac-
tions, and by explicitly making the scheme exclusive, Congress in-
tended to exclude other methods of interfering with the regulatory
action.'78
Thus, contrary to Colonial Realty, MCorp can be (and has
been) interpreted to hold, as Firstcorp holds, that the anti-
injunction provisions of Title 12 trump the automatic stay of
Title 11. That those courts failed to address the fact that the
automatic stay is the result of congressional mandate, rather
than court exercise of "jurisdiction to effect by injunction [12
U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1)]" or court "action ... to restrain [12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(j)]" makes the reasoning of those cases suspect. Nota-
bly, the Second Circuit believed that Firstcorp was contrary to
MCorp.'79 Because Colonial Realty is the more recent deci-
sion, other courts hopefully will adopt the simple, yet cogent,
reasoning of Colonial Realty.'
I', Id. at 943.
17' Id. at 945-46.
177 Id. at 946.
178 Id. In a footnote, the court noted that its holding on the anti-injunction pro-
vision rendered unnecessary a discussion of the "police and regulatory powers"
exception relied upon in MCorp. Id. at 946 n.5.
171 Colonial Realty, 980 F.2d at 137. Colonial Realty did not further address
this apparent conflict.
18 The bankruptcy court in First City Asset Servicing Co. v. FDIC (In re First
City Asset Servicing Co.), 158 B.R. 78 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993), appears to have
expressly adopted the Colonial Realty reasoning. Id. at 81.
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CONCLUSION
In Colonial Realty, the Second Circuit demonstrated
through rudimentary analysis that a balance between two
ostensibly conflicting statutes could be achieved and the pur-
poses and policies of each harmonized without violence to ei-
ther. There is nothing in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
that would prevent the FDIC from seeking its rights and reme-
dies through the bankruptcy court. Likewise, as noted by the
Second Circuit, there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that
would preclude the bankruptcy court (or the district court,
were the reference to the bankruptcy court withdrawn) from
granting the provisional and final relief sought by the FDIC.
The FDIC's appellate briefs and actions in the Colonial
Realty case, not surprisingly, evidence that the agency was not
interested in this "compromise" decision. The FDIC was hope-
ful that another appellate court would find its nascent powers
truly "super."
In addition to becoming one of the first (if not the first)
court of appeals to find bankruptcy and bank insolvency law
compatible, the Second Circuit, through its adoption of the
Saunders reasoning, became the first to reject the strained
analysis of MortgageAmerica and its progeny. It is now clear
that the impact of the automatic stay on third-party actions
against fraudulent transfer recipients is based on the fact that
such actions seek to recover claims against the debtor rather
than the fiction that the debtor retains a legal or equitable
interest in such property. The Second Circuit's Colonial Realty
decision is to be commended.
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